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REVIEWS
This issue sees the launch of a book review section in the Journal of International Economic
Law. Our first book review is presented below, and we hope that in later issues we will
be able to develop a more substantial book review section. We invite readers to consider
submitting short reviews to the Editorial Office (details on inside back cover).
Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International
Environmental Accord. By EDrrH BROWN wEiss and HAROLD K. JACOBSON (eds),
Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1998. ISBN 0262231980. 564 pp. $55 hardbound.
INTRODUCTION
Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K. Jacobson's book, Engaging Countries: Strengthening
Compliance with International EnvironmentalAccords, represents an ambitious effort to iden-
tify the factors that result in successful environmental treaties.' The Brown Weiss and
Jacobson study examines five international environmental treaties: the World Heritage
Convention, the Convention on International Trade and Endangered Species (CITES),
the London Convention of 1972 (formerly called the London Ocean Dumping
Convention), the 1983 International Tropical Timber Agreement (TA), and the
Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer. The study examines
compliance with these treaties by eight countries (Brazil, Cameroon, China, Hungary,
India, Japan, Russia, and the United States) as well as the European Union. It reviews
four major hypotheses and dozens of sub-hypotheses about what produces effective
agreements.
The information that the authors have gathered is sweeping in its coverage and help-
ful in developing a picture of what leads to good international pollution control and
resource management programs. Nevertheless, the volume falls short in some regards. In
particular, the matrix implied by the analytic framework described above is not fully devel-
oped. Indeed, the editors concede early on that they have 'too many variables and too
few cases' 2 to be conclusive about what it takes to successfully engage countries in inter-
national environmental protection efforts.
The book contains several overarching chapters that provide important theoretical
insights into what makes for successful global-scale environmental programs. In 'How
Compliance Happens and Doesn't Happen Domestically', David Vogel and Timothy
Kessler identify the critical variables that determine policy success at the national level?
They focus on administrative compliance and monitoring (including the strength of feed-
back mechanisms and the number and size of parties within the regulated community),
the adequacy of enforcement mechanisms, political will (a function of public opinion, the
leadership of politicians, and the impact of nongovernmental organizations), and the eco-
nomic environment (in which wealth provides both the resources and the will to make
environmental protection a priority). A number of these factors also shape the success of
internationally agreed environmental policies, which, to be successful, must be imple-
mented at the domestic level.
Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K. Jacobson, Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with
International Environmental Accords (1998) at 3 (hereinafter Engaging Countries).
Engaging Countries at 8.
3 Engaging Countries at 19-38.
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In another chapter, Abe Chayes, Antonia Chayes, and Ronald Mitchell renew their calls
for less emphasis in the international domain on 'enforcement' of agreements and more
efforts devoted to assisting countries in trying to meet their obligations. 4 The 'Managed
Compliance' School argues that a good bit of noncompliance with international agree-
ments is not intentional but rather a function of incapacity. Thus, international efforts
should focus on providing inducements as well as technical support to those who would
like to comply but whose ability to do so is limited.
Sheila Jasanoff argues in a chapter entitled 'Contingent Knowledge: Implications for
Implementation and Compliance' that science can play an important role in environmental
policymaking but that it must be understood that all environmental knowledge is socially
constructed.5 Jasanoff nevertheless notes that, while there is often a high degree of uncer-
tainty in the important factors that go into environmental policymaking, the contingency
of scientific and technical information can be overcome through 'convergent interpreta-
tive practices', including standardization and the cognitive evolution of transnational agen-
cies and actors.6 Jasanoff argues that standardization offers a process by which
policy-relevant knowledge can be stabilized across divergent political and cultural spheres.7
She concludes that the need to build on a scientific and technological base for successful
treaty-making calls for a focus on the institutional and procedural dimensions of interna-
tional regimes - particularly as places where words and ideas are translated into action.8
Jasanoff's explanation of how international agreements can work as mechanisms to bring
people with divergent visions and values together represents real insight.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Perhaps the most valuable element of the volume is Edith Brown Weiss's central chapter
on the five treaties that are the focus of the study.9 Professor Brown Weiss's comprehen-
sive analysis of the different approaches that have been taken across the natural resource
management and pollution control spectrum is full of interesting data and observations.
She notes, for example, the very significant role that nongovernmental organizations, par-
ticularly the World Wildlife Fund's TRAFFIC, have played in highlighting violations of
CITES. And she adds that one of CITES's major weaknesses Hes in its limited focus on
protecting endangered species that are traded across international borders.
In some cases, an even deeper level of analysis might have been possible. Other stud-
ies of CITES have noted, for example, that the treaty is also less than fully successful, in
part, because it is often applied only to 'charismatic mammals'. CITES does little, more-
over, to focus attention on habitat destruction, which is the cause of the loss of species
in many cases.' 0
One of the most interesting elements of the Brown Weiss effort is her rigorous adher-
ence to the matrix of analysis identified at the outset of the book. With regard to each
4 See Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes, and Ronald D. Mitchell, Managing Compliance: A
Comparative Perspective (Chap. 3) in Engaging Countries at 39--62. See also Abram Chayes and
Antonia H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with Treaties in International Regulatory Regimes
(1995).
s Engaging Countries at 63-88.
6 Engaging Countries at 68.
1 Engaging Countries at 72.
3 Engaging Countries at 85.
' Edith Brown Weiss, The Five International Treaties: A Living History (Chap. 5) in Engaging Countries
at 89.
': See Ginette Hemley, International Wildlife Trade: A CITES Sourcebook (1.994) (hereinafter Hemley,
CITES Sourcebook).
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major accord, Professor Brown Weiss examines treaty commitments and structure, imple-
mentation of the agreement, the secretariat and support structure, the role of non-
governmental organizations, financial arrangements, dispute settlement, and monitoring
and compliance mechanisms. This analytic consistency across all five treaties allows for
real comparative insights. One can see, for example, that the data on reporting under
CITES has steadily improved and that the very high degree of compliance with the report-
ing requirements is now a considerable strength of the international effort to protect endan-
gered species." In contrast, fewer than 50 percent of the reports required under the
London Convention have been filed in recent years'2 - and thus the treaty continues to
fall short of expectations.
Given the enormous amount of information that Professor Brown Weiss advances and
her success in applying a comparative structural framework to the various treaties, it is
perhaps quibbling to note that, in many cases, it would have been valuable to have some
deeper analysis of the data presented. It is very interesting to hear, for instance, that a
third of the budget of the ITTA is provided by Japan. But left unanswered is the ques-
tion of the implications of having such a significant percentage of an international agree-
ment funded by a single country with a particular set of interests.
Professor Brown Weiss's review leads to some notable conclusions. First, the role of
NGOs in helping to provide support to the inevitably limited treaty secretariats has become
very important. Second, transparency and openness of the policy process makes a big
difference in the level of compliance and the effectiveness of the policy that flows from
the treaty. Third, given the limitations on enforcement in the international domain, the
vigor of monitoring and reporting requirements represents a critical determinant of
success. Fourth, the world of international environmental protection is quite dynamic,
and the most successful treaties have evolved over time in directions that improved their
effectiveness.
Professor Brown Weiss does not explore several other conclusions that might also have
been drawn. In particular, she soft-peddles (as do almost all of the authors in this vol-
ume) the value of trade penalties as an enforcement mechanism to reinforce international
environmental policies. Passing references are made to the threat of trade measures. Little
is made of the accounts by others of the important role the Montreal Protocol trade pro-
visions played in getting India and China to sign on to the global-scale effort to protect
the ozone layer.' 3 The role trade measures (especially those unilaterally threatened by the
United States) have played as a mechanism for improving compliance with CITES is also
largely overlooked.14 A significant number of other analysts of international agreements
have concluded that these trade measures were an important part of the structure that
emerged and had some impact on the level of compliance.' 5 That this study comes to dif-
ferent conclusions may not be a surprise. But that the authors and editors spend so little
" Engaging Countries at 112-13.
12 Engaging Countries at 332.
13 See Richard Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planer (1994); Daniel
C. Esty, Greening the GA7T. Trade, Environment, and the Future (1994), Johannes Heister, 'Who
Will Win the Ozone Game?', Kiel Working Paper No. 579 (1993).
14 The United States, for example, has imposed sanctions against Taiwan for failing to control trade
in tiger and rhinoceros bones and body parts. See 59 Fed. Reg. 40,463 (2 August 1994). The sanc-
tions were lifted in 1997. See 62 Fed. Reg. 23,479 (30 April 1997); see also Hemley, CITES
Sourcebook.
Is See, e.g., 'The Creation of International Environmental Agreements', 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1521,
1539 (1992); Duncan Brack, International Trade and the Montreal Protocol (1996); Daniel C. Esty,
Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future (1994).
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time explaining why their results diverge from what others have found is unfortunate. 6
Indeed, the very structure of the comparisons, which does not even include trade mea-
sures as a category for analysis, is revealing.
One might also question whether more time and attention should have been given to
the role of economic incentives in supporting international environmental goals.
Increasingly, it is recognized in domestic policymaking that harnessing market forces is a
critical dimension of successful policymaking. The same point is now being advanced in
the international realm.' 7
CASE STUDIES
The nine chapters studying individual country compliance are interesting but uneven.
Unlike Professor Brown Weiss, who carefully follows a matrix approach to analyzing the
treaties across a common set of key issues, the individual country analyses do not track
systematically any taxonomic structure. Thus, the evidence that is brought forth and the
information that is made available is anecdotally instructive but hard to draw clear con-
clusions from.
The chapter by Michael Glennon and Allison Stewart identifies a range of reasons why
the United States is relatively good at implementing international environmental treaties.10
.They note that the United States has an environmental orientation both by culture and
religion. The existence within the United States of legal mechanisms to reinforce policy
and administrative agencies in courts adds to the seriousness of environmental purpose.
More importantly, the US political system is relatively open; both NGOs and the press
play an important role in keeping the pressure on government officials to perform. Glennon
and Stewart note that the wealth of the United States and its capacity to afford environ-
mental protection cannot be gainsayed as a reason for the relatively high degree of com-
pliance by the United States with international environmental agreements. They also
observe that political leadership is important and that the US federal structure makes com-
pliance with environmental policy goals easier and cheaper. Some discussion of whether
the factors that Glennon and Stewart identify as critical to the United States are also pre-
sent in other federal systems would have been useful.
The chapter by Alberta Spragia and Philipp Hildebrand on the European Union
addresses some of the variables identified by Glennon and Stewart, but not all.' 9 Spragia
and Hildebrand note that the institutional capacity of the European Union is still evolv-
ing and emerging. They suggest that the lack of depth and breadth in the EU legal mech-
anisms and institutions explains why compliance has been less strong in parts of Europe
than in the United States. Spragia and Hildebrand argue that the presence of a European
Union level of governance in Brussels improves compliance, but they do not push this
analysis very far.
16 In fact, having downplayed the threat of trade measures as a critical factor in treaty compliance
through 500 pages, Professors Jacobson and Brown Weiss do list 'coercive measures' as one of
three 'broad strategies' for strengthening international environmental efforts in their closing chapter.
See text discussion at footnote 23 below.
17 See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty and Robert Mendelsohn, 'Moving From Domestic to International
Policymaking', 31 Policy Sciences 225 (1998) (hereinafter 'International Policymaking'); Robert
W. Hahn and Kenneth R. Richards, 'The Internationalization of Environmental Regulation', 30
Harv., Int'l. LJ. 421 (1989); Richard B. Stewart, 'Environmental Regulation and International
Competitiveness', 102 Yale L'. 2039 (1993).
"8 Michael J. Glennon and Allison L Stewart, 'The United States: Taking Environmental Treaties
Seriously', (Chap. 6) in Engaging Countries at 173-214.
19 Alberta M. Spragia and Philipp Hildebrand, 'The European Union and Compliance: A Story in
the Making', (Chap. 7) in Engaging Countries at 215-52.
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Ellen Comisso and Peter Hardi provide an interesting review of compliance in
Hungary. 0 They find two key reasons why Hungary has made reasonably significant efforts
to implement international environmental agreements. First, they note that accession to
international environmental treaties, while in some respects symbolic, has served as an
important signal of Hungary's interests in reaching out to the West. Second, the
authors argue that Hungary's regulatory institutions, which did not collapse after the fall
of communism (in contrast with Russia), provided an apparatus for implementing envi-
ronmental policy, including priorities agreed upon at the international scale. In fact, the
presence of a functioning civil service emerges as one of the critical variables across all of
the country studies.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Professors Jacobson and Brown Weiss pull the study together in a final chapter on 'Assessing
the Record and Designing Strategies to Engage Countries'.2 1 They note a secular trend
toward better international environmental policy implementation and compliance. They see
commitments to international environmental efforts deepening over time with increased
funding and, in some cases, treaties being ratcheted up in strength as the parties become
comfortable with the environmental efforts they are undertaking jointly. They observe an
important and growing role for NGOs as part of the policy structure.
Jacobson and Brown Weiss attempt to distill the critical variables from the case stud-
ies. They suggest, for instance, that the particular features of the environmental activity
matter, including the number of actors involved (fewer actors are easier to manage), the
size of the firms that must be regulated (bigger firms are easier to regulate), and the degree
of compliance of key participants (once the pattern is set by the major actors others will
follow).
The 'characteristics of the accord' also appear to matter. Fairness is a critical variable.
One of the reasons the Montreal Protocol has attracted a large number of signatories is
its structure, which acknowledges different compliance capacities, establishes differenti-
ated obligations for developed and developing countries, and makes funding available to
developing countries to subsidize the purchase of CFC substitutes. In general, treaties
with more precise obligations function more effectively than those with vague require-
ments. Access to scientific and technical information will often support compliance, as do
regular reporting requirements and the capacity to monitor the data that is presented.
The international policy context is also clearly important. Major international confer-
ences can raise the salience of particular issues. For example, the Rio Earth Summit in
1992 helped to push forward the effort to conclude a number of international environ-
mental agreements, including the Climate Change Convention. International momentum
for action can also be generated by the media, public opinion, NGOs, international orga-
nizations, and international financing bodies.
In terms of understanding what policy interventions might improve compliance and
implementation, a number of critical factors are identified. First, richer and more demo-
cratic countries will generally comply more fully than poorer and less democratic ones.
Unfortunately, these are hard variables to change in the short run. Similarly, the greater
the degree of administrative capacity in general and environmental regulatory strength in
particular, the more likely it is a country will be able to meet international obligations.
As a rule, market economies appear better positioned to meet the demands of
20 Ellen Cornisso and Peter Hardi with Laszlo Bencze, 'Hungary: Political Interest, Bureaucrat Will'
(Chap. 10) in Engaging Countries at 327-52.
21 Harold K. Jacobson and Edith Brown Weiss, 'Assessing the Record and Designing Strategies to
Engage Countries', (Chap. 15) in Engaging Coutrier at 511-54.
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implementation than non-market economies. Likewise, countries engaged in significant
international trade will, in general, have structures in place that help make treaty imple-
mentation possible.
One of the conclusions that is touched on briefly but not developed as fully as it might
have been involves the strength of federalism within a country. Jacobson and Brown Weiss
suggest that excessive decentralization makes it difficult to implement international envi-
ronmental policy. They point to the weakening of political control in Moscow and Beijing
as unconstructive developments vis-4-vis compliance by Russia and China with interna-
tional environmental accounts. They might, however, have drawn an even stronger con-
clusion: successful policy implementation requires multiple tiers of regulating authorities
and governance structures.Y
In synthesizing the results of the study, Jacobson and Brown Weiss identify three broad
strategies for strengthening global-scale environmental efforts: (1) greater 'sunshine'
including monitoring, reporting, inspections, access to information, and NGO participa-
tion; (2) 'positive incentives' including such inducements as financial and technical
support, training, and access to technology; and (3) 'coercive measures' including trade
penalties, sanctions, and withdrawal of other privileges.23 Each, they suggest, can con-
tribute to treaty compliance.
They close with prescriptions for policymakers on how to engage countries in interna-
tional environmental programs. Some of the recommendations reflect advice on how to
draft treaties, other suggestions go to the institutional structures that should be put in
place to support international accords, and some of the ideas reflect strategies for making
sure that what is agreed upon will be implemented effectively.
WHAT'S MISSING
While Engaging Countries covers a great deal of ground, it underplays or misses some quite
critical points that relate to the success of international environmental policymaking. For
example, almost no mention is made of the importance of targeting international policy-
making on issues where there are significant gains to collective action.2 4 To the extent
that the World Heritage Convention has not been a great success, perhaps the reason is
that there is no pressing reason for the substance of this treaty to be handled at an inter-
national level. Where the gains from international cooperation are more clear, such as the
benefits of protecting the ozone layer addressed by the Montreal Protocol, it is often eas-
ier to get countries to participate and to take their obligations seriously.
It would have been useful to have some discussion of the conditions that make 'col-
lective action' possible. In fact, although the volume is interdisciplinary in many respects,
it is light on economic perspectives. The lessons learned from game theory about how to
overcome prisoners' dilemma dynamics and to achieve collective action are important to
understanding international environmental policymaking and are largely missing from this
volume.25
22 See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, 'Revitalizing Environmental Federalism', 95 Michigan L. Rev. 570 (1996)
(arguing against a sweeping presumption in favor of decentralized environmental governance and
for a multi-tier regulatory structure).
"" Jacobson and Brown Weiss, Engaging Countries at 542.
24 See Esty and Mendelsohn, 'International Policymaking' at 227-28.
21 For an introduction to game theory, see Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically
(199 1). For articles applying game theory to international cooperation, see e.g., Hugh Ward, 'Game
Theory and the Politics of the Global Commons', 37 J. Conflict Resolution 203 (1993); Hugh
Axelrod and Robert 0. Keohane, 'Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and
Institutions', World Politics, October 1985 at 226; Kenneth A. Oye, 'Explaining Cooperation Under
Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies', World Politics, October 1985 at 1; Arthur A. Stein,
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Although there is some discussion of the danger of excessive decentralization, there is
too little analysis of the proper structure of environmental policymaking. One can con-
clude from the case studies presented that federal systems, with regulatory authorities
available to implement policy at various geographic scales, generally work better than
systems where all policy-making is done at a single level. In fact, the data presented strongly
reinforce the value of having authorities at various levels and scales providing a system of
checks and balances. But the need for multi-tier environmental policymaking, including
a more vigorous governance structure at the international level, is not a conclusion that
is driven home in this volume.
Another observation that emerges from the case studies, but which does not emerge as a
theme in this volume, is the need for analytic rigor in international environmental policy-
making.26 Where international collaborative efforts have been weak, it is often because the
underpinnings and logic of a global-scale project are not well founded. For example, the
1TIA (recognized by the authors of this volume to be one of the less successful interna-
tional environmental agreements) has a weak underlying rationale. UNCrAD's interest in
commodity agreements has now been recognized to be largely off the mark, and inconsis-
tent with market economics. 2 My own experience as an environmental negotiator 8 and the
stories presented in this volume lead me to believe that the most important feature of good
international environmental policymaking is sound analysis. Where a solid intellectual foun-
dation is laid and good logic prevails, the treaties that emerge will be valuable. Where these
features are missing, no matter what the structure or the process by which the treaty was
produced, the international agreement is not likely to be seen to have value over time.
A final striking aspect of the material presented in Engaging Countries - but given little
attention by the authors and editors - is the degree to which the world community under-
invests in international environmental policymaking. As the data in Engaging Countries sug-
gests, the budgets for the World Heritage Convention, CITES, IA, the London
Convention, and the Montreal Protocol range from under one million dollars per year to
about four million dollars per year.29 This pittance, in a world with a global economy that
generates nearly $30 trillion of economic activity each year, is remarkable?0
'Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World', 36 International Organization
299 (1982). For a combination of game theory and negotiation analysis in studying international
cooperation, see James K. Sebenius, 'Challenging Conventional Explanations of International
Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities', 46 International
Organization 323 (1992); James K. Sebenius, 'Designing Negotiations Toward a New Regime: The
Case of Global Warming', Inzernational Security, Spring 1991 at 110. For legal literature on game
theory analyses of the formation of international environmental agreements, see , e.g., Robert J.
Schmidt, Jr., 'International Negotiations Paralyzed by Domestic Politics: Two-Level Game Theory
and the Problem of the Pacific Salmon Commission', 26 Envtl. L. 95 (1996); Adam Chase, 'Barriers
to International Agreements for the Adaptation and Mitigation of Global Climate Change: A Law
and Economics Approach', 1 Envti. UJ. 17, 35 (1994).
26 See Daniel C. Esty, 'Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization:
Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion', 1 J. of Int'l. Econ. L. 123, 126-27 and 135-37 (1998).
27 See, e.g., Christopher L. Gilbert, 'International Commodity Agreements: An Obituary Notice', 24
World Development 1 (1996).
18 As an official of the US Environmental Protection Agency from 1989-93, the author participated
in negotiations on the London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol, the 1992 Climate Change
Treaty, the environmental provisions of the NAFTA, the environmental provisions of the GATT
Uruguay Round, the negotiations that led to the setting up of the Global Environmental Facility
among others.
29 Engaging Countries at 91.
30 By way of comparison, the annual budget of the US Environmental Protection Agency exceeds $7
billion.
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The integrity of the international economic system depends on internalizing global scale
externalities. Where shared resources are mismanaged, or transboundary pollution is not
controlled, market failures will disrupt the economic efficiency of international economic
relations. The result will not only be reduced social welfare and diminished gains from
trade, but also significant environmental degradation. That the world community invests
so little in protecting itself against these market failures and in acquiring the benefits of
public health and ecological protection from international-scale threats is the real story of
Engaging Countries - and yet one that is barely noted.
Daniel C. Esty*
Yale Law School and Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies, PO Box 208215, New
Haven, CT 06520, USA; formerly Deputy Chief of Staff and Deputy Assistant Administrator for
Policy, Planning and Evaluation at the US Environmental Protection Agency; AB, Harvard; MA,
Oxford; JD, Yale. Thanks to Eric Biber and Tracy Triplett for research assistance.
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Notes, Comments and Developments
SUCCESS FOR PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS




Private parties have often complained that they do not have direct access to
what is proving to be the highly effective dispute settlement system of the
WTO. To address this concern, in December 1994, the European Union
adopted its Trade Barriers Regulation (TBR)l in order to provide a mechanism
for private parties to bring their allegations of violations of international trade
agreements to the attention of the EU authorities, with the pledge that the
EU would pursue worthy cases in the WTO.
The response from private parties has been slow at the start, as, by the
end of 1998, the Commission had only received eleven complaints that set
out a sufficient prima fade case of a WTO violation to justify the opening of
the TBR's examination procedure. However, the treatment of those cases
should prove encouraging to potential complainants, as 1998 saw the first
complaints brought by private parties under the TBR referred to WTO dis-
pute settlement: the USA - Rules of Origin for Textile and Apparel case, the
USA - Antidumping Act of 1916 case and the Japan - Imports of Leather case.
Furthermore, the Commission has published two further decisions to pur-
sue private TBR complaints in the WTO, the Argentina - Leather Exports
and Imports case and the USA - Copyright Act case.
2
* Attorney, Stibbe Simont Monahan Duhot, 47-51 rue Henri Wafelaerts, 1060 Brussels, Belgium.
The author wishes to thank Mr. Petros Sourmelis of the European Commission for helpful com-
ments on a draft of this note, although any errors or omissions are solely those of the author. This
note is a follow-up to McNelis, 'The European Trade Barriers Regulation: A More Effective
Instrument', which appeared in the Journal of International Economic Law (J. Int'l Econ. L), vol.
1, no. 1, at 149. See also, Mavroidis and Zdouc, 'Legal Means to Protect Private Parties' Interests
in the WTO', 1 J. Int'l Econ. L 3 (September 1998), at 407.
Council Regulation (EC) No. 3286/94 of 22 December 1994, laying down Community procedures
in the field of the common commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the Community's
rights under international trade rules, in particular those established under the auspices of the World
Trade Organization, Official Journal of the European Communities (OJEC) of 31 December 1994,
L 349, p. 71.
References to the European Commission decisions in these cases are as follows: USA - Rules of
Origin for Textile and Apparel (OJEC 1997 L 62, p. 43, investigation opened by OJEC 1996 C 351,
p. 6); USA - Antidumping Act of 1916 (OJEC 1998 L 126, p. 36, investigation opened by OJEC
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This note will first review those five cases, and then will draw some con-
clusions about the early TBR practice.
1. USA - RULES OF ORIGIN FOR TEXTILE AND APPAREL
The first complaint brought under the TBR, the USA - Rules of Origin for
Textile and Apparel case, was also the first to be referred to the WTO for
consultations, in May 1997. However, the day before formal consultations
were due to begin, the EU reached a solution through informal consulta-
tions with the US. Therefore, the WTO dispute settlement procedure was
suspended, and on 11 February 1998, the two parties notified their mutu-
ally agreed solution to the WTO, pursuant to Article 3.1 of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding.
However, the mutually agreed solution was not to last: on 19 November
1998, the EU again asked for formal WTO consultations in this matter,
claiming that the US had not implemented its commitments as contained in
that agreement with the result that, in the EU view, the US is still acting in
a manner inconsistent with its obligations under the WTO.
This dispute arose as a TBR complaint lodged in October 1996 by the
Italian textile association Federtessile. Federtessile alleged that, contrary to
its WTO obligations, the US had changed its rules of origin such that 'grey'
fabric made outside the EU but dyed, printed and finished in the EU would
no longer be considered to have Community origin, but rather would have
the origin of the grey fabric. Furthermore, Federtessile complained that such
textiles would no longer be allowed to be marked 'Made in Europe' in the
US. Federtessile was, among other things, concerned that the exports of its
members to the US would be hit by quotas applying to third countries, and
that loss of the 'Made in Europe' marking would make its members' prod-
ucts less commercially attractive.
The Commission found that the complaint contained sufficient evidence to
warrant the opening of an examination procedure under Article 8 TBR, and
it initiated said procedure on 22 November 1996. Through its investigation
of the case, the Commission ultimately found that the complaint was correct
in its allegations that the changes to the US rules of origin amounted to vio-
lations of the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, the Agreement on
Rules of Origin, Article I GATT 1994, and the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade. The Commission further determined that these violations
are likely to have adverse trade effects within the meaning of Article 2.4 TBR
and that it would be in the Community interest to take action. Therefore, it
formally decided on 18 February 1997 to refer this case to the WTO.
1997 C 58, p. 14); Japan - Imports of Leather (OJEC 1998 L 159, p. 65, investigation opened by
OJEC 1997, C 110, p. 2); Argentina - Leather Exports and Imports (OJEC 1998 L 295, p. 46, inves-
tigation opened by OJEC 1997 C 59, p. 6); USA - Copyright Act (OJEC 1998 L 346, p. 60, inves-
tigation opened by OJEC 1997 C 177, p. 5).
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